NOTE
STATE ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
STATUTES: ARE WE QUIETLY
REPEALING THE AMERICAN RULE?
I
INTRODUCTION

The ordinary and historical rule in the United States has been that individual
litigants are responsible for their own attorney fees.' Recently, however, this
American rule has undergone extensive examination and has received a fair
amount of criticism. 2 Indeed, there seems to be some basis for this criticism of the
American rule-often, it leads to socially undesirable results. For example,
requiring individual litigants to pay their own attorney fees makes the pursuit of
small meritorious claims cost-ineffective. 3 Further, the poorer litigant may find
himself in an unequal bargaining position with respect to his richer opponent
whose enormous resources can finance prolonged litigation. 4 Deviation from the
American rule might ameliorate such problems and lead to other socially desirable
results. For example, in many situations an award of attorney fees to successful
litigants might promote certain public interests. 5 Attorney fee shifting can also be
used as an effective deterrent against frivolous suits and dilatory and bad faith
6
tactics.
In response to these concerns, both Congress and state legislatures have increasingly enacted statutes to relieve the hardships of the American rule for certain
litigants. This note surveys and examines one of the states' responses to the American rule, that is, the enactment of attorney fee shifting statutes.
To analyze state statutory responses to the American rule, the authors conducted an historical and descriptive survey of those statutes of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia which empower courts to require a litigant to pay his
1. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). See generally Leubsdorf, Towarda Hl-tory of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at

9.
2.

See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966);

Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation., 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963); McLaughlin, The
Recovery of Attorney's Fees. A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 648-55 (1974).
3. Mause, Winner Takes All 4 Re-Examnation of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REV. 26, 33 (1969);
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure andJudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 437-38

(1973).
4. See Mause, supra note 3, at 36.
5. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 767.
6. Rowe, Predictingthe Effects of Attorney Fee Shiffing, LAw & CONTEMP: PROBS., Winter, 1984, at 139.
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opponent's attorney fees. In essence, this note provides a tabular and graphic display of the survey results, and an analysis of the most significant findings.
Section II provides an introductory explanation of the survey's initial goals and
some of the survey's most significant findings. Section III details the methodology
employed by the authors and discusses limitations on conclusions that can be
drawn because of the methods used. Section IV provides a simple graphic and
tabular display of the survey results and a brief quantitative analysis of the survey
results. Finally, Section V explores the actual impact, if any, which these statutes
have had on the American rule.
II
SURVEY PURPOSES

Initially, the authors hoped that a survey of state attorney fee shifting would
provide some answers concerning the existence, growth, and effect of these statutes.
To answer these questions, the authors identified a number of purposes or goals to
be accomplished by the survey, and then devised the survey to accomplish these
purposes.
The most important goal of the survey was to provide an accurate, descriptive
tabulation of existing state attorney fee shifting statutes. The authors feel fairly
confident that the statutory survey accomplished this goal. In the 51 jurisdictions
surveyed, the authors uncovered and evaluated approximately 2,000 attorney fee
shifting statutes.7 Thus, this survey probably represents the most current comprehensive tabulation of state attorney fee shifting statutes.
Besides this obvious goal, however, the authors identified some additional
objectives of the survey. First, the survey was designed to identify the predominant methods of effectuating a fee shift by statute. For example, the survey
revealed that, unlike the English rule which grants attorney fees to the prevailing
litigant, the vast majority of state attorney fee shifting statutes allow fee shifting
only to prevailing plaintiffs.8 Second, the authors sought to identify those areas in
which state legislatures are apt to provide for attorney fee shifting. The survey
proved to be most helpful in answering this question. Although the survey results
showed that states, on the whole, enact a large number of fee shifting statutes that
deal with judicial procedure, it also demonstrated that legislatures have provided
for fee shifting in a wide number of other areas. 9 The authors also sought to determine whether a state's population size, population concentration, or geographic
location within the Union had any effect on the propensity of its legislature to
enact attorney fee shifting statutes. Although the survey provided no clear answer
to this question, the results did show that Eastern states, on the average, have
substantially fewer attorney fee shifting statutes per state than the rest of the
nation. 10

7. See infra p. 323.
8. See trn/a p. 331.
9. See trnJa p. 329.
10. See rbna p. 339.
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The survey was also designed to provide an historical breakdown of attorney
fee shifting statutes. Such a breakdown, it was hoped, could possibly provide
insight into future trends. For example, the survey revealed the enactment of a
large number of fee shifting statutes in the last two decades.I' Indeed, the continuation in recent years of high rates of enactment suggests no early slackening of this
pace of legislative activity.
Finally, the most ambitious goal of the survey was to determine what extent, if
any, the American rule-that each litigant pay his own attorney fee-had been
affected by the enactment of these fee shifting statutes. Unfortunately, the survey
results failed to provide a complete and satisfactory answer to this question since
an in-depth examination of each statute's judicial application proved prohibitively
time consuming. Nevertheless, a limited scan of reported cases that used these statutes did reveal that attorney fee shifting statutes were making some inroads into
the American rule.1 2 Indeed, an examination of this question suggested that one
factor impeding the impact of these statutes upon the American rule may be litigant and attorney ignorance of the existence of such statutes.
III
METHODOLOGY

The authors began the survey by searching the codes of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia13 for those statutes' 4 which authorize attorney fee shifting.
The comprehensiveness of the search, however, was constrained by three factors.
First, the search was limited to those statutes which had been indexed under the
"attorney" or "attorney fees" section of each state's code index. 1 5 Second, the
survey was limited to statutes currently in force. Indeed, statutes currently in
force, as compared to repealed statutes, are most relevant to the purposes of this
survey since the survey attempts to provide a descriptive tabulation of existzng
attorney fee shifting statutes. Finally, the survey concentrated solely on those statutes that empower courts to require one party to pay the other party's attorney fees.
Thus, statutes that merely sanction or limit the right to provide contractually for
the payment of attorney fees or that provide for reimbursement for courtappointed attorneys were not included.
Despite these limitations, however, the search of the codes still required the
authors to examine approximately 4,000-5,000 statutes.16 Of these statutes, 1,974
of them were found to be "attorney fee shifting" statutes.
Upon discovery of a fee shifting statute, the authors tabulated it according to
7
the following features:'
(1) State;
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
statutes
17.

See infra pp. 340-41.
See infra p. 345.
For purposes of this note, the District of Columbia is included in the term "states."
The authors surveyed both state statutes and state rules of civil procedure.
This limitation was necessary because of time constraints.
This statutory survey was conducted by the authors over a one-year period and covered all current
enacted before 1983.
These variables are discussed at length later in this article. See tnjra pp. 324-28.
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Geographic region of the country;
Statehood year;
State population (large, medium, or small);
State population concentration (urban or rural);
Enactment year;
Subject matter;
Beneficiary of fee shift;
Whether fee shifting is mandatory or discretionary; and
The standard, if any, the court is to follow in awarding attorney fees;
Calculation of the fee award; and
Purpose(s) of the statute.
Subsequently, the authors devised a computer format to allow for a correlation
of these variables among the 1,974 statutes and entered the information on each
evaluated statute onto a single record in the computer file, resulting in 1,974 computer records. Using this data base, the authors could search through all the statutes and identify those statutes with a common variable or combination of
variables.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

A.

State-Specific Variables

Each statute record contains five state-specific variables: state, geographic
region, statehood year, population, and population concentration. Inclusion of
these variables on each file allowed the authors to test simple hypotheses such as
the prevalence of fee shifting statutes in the Northeast versus the South, or in large
states versus small states. The following provides a brief explanation of these
variables.
Besides a state-by-state breakdown, the authors grouped the states into nine
21
19
Southeastern,2 0 Southern,
geographic regions: New England,"' Mid-Atlantic,
South Central, 22 North Central,2 3 Midwest, 24 Mountain,2 5 and Pacific. 2 6 The
statehood variable marks the year that the state was admitted to the Union.
Each state was also placed in one of three categories based upon its population.
Those states with populations greater than 7.5 million were considered large
18. Those states classified as New England states are: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont.
19. Those states classified as Mid-Atlantic states are: Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia.
20. Those states classified as Southeastern states are: Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia.
21. Those states classified as Southern states are: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South
Carolina.
22. Those states classified as South Central states are: Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Texas.
23. Those states classified as North Central states are: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin.
24. Those states classified as Midwest states are: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota.
25. Those states classified as Mountain states are: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah, Wyoming.
26. Those states classified as Pacific states are: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington.

Page 321: Winter 1984]

STATE STATUTES

states; 2 7

those states with populations less than 7.5 million but greater than 2 million were classified as medium states; 28 and those states with populations less than
2 million were considered small states.2 9 Naturally, this variable, considered alone,
is a comparatively rough statistic since it fails to take into account the physical
area encompassed by the state or the percentage of the population living in urban
versus rural areas. Therefore, an additional variable-population concentrationwas included in the survey. Thus, those states with over 50% of their population
living in metropolitan areas were classified as urban, 30 while those with less than
50% of their population living in metropolitan areas were classified as rural. 31
B.

Statute-Specific Variables

Each statute record also contains seven statute-specific variables: year of enactment, subject matter, beneficiary, discretionary/mandatory, standard, calculation,
and purpose(s).
Year of enactment is the year in which the attorney fee shifting portion of the
statute was adopted, either as a tack-on amendment to an existing statute or as
part of the original statute. The authors experienced some difficulty in pinpointing enactment years for some statutes because the state codes, at times, failed
to provide sufficient detail concerning the historical evolution of the statute. Fortunately, the vast majority of the codes were sufficiently detailed so as to permit
32
this variable to be reasonably accurate.
The authors then determined the subject matter of each statute, classifying
each statute according to one of twenty-six categories. A detailed list of these categories is provided below. 33 It is important to note that the vast majority of the
27. The nine states designated as large states are: California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
28. The 24 states designated as medium states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minneosta,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
29. The 18 states designated as small states are: Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

30. The 32 states designated as urban are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
31. The 19 states designated as rural states are: Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
32. To insure the accuracy of this variable, the authors occasionally checked older state code editions
to see if the present code editors were providing an accurate history of the statute.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

33. The following subject matter categories were used:
Agriculture;
Antitrust: monopoly, price discrimination, restraints of trade, unfair trade practices;
Assessments: city liens, city services, lien enforcement;
Banking and commercial law: dishonored checks, general banking laws;
Civil rights;

(6) Consumer transactions: consumer contract claims, consumer financing transactions, warranty violations;

(7) Corporate law: accounting actions, derivative actions, dissenting shareholder rights;
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statutes easily fit into the specified categories. Occasionally, however, a statute
appeared to fit within more than one of the enumerated categories. In those
instances, the authors chose the subject matter category which most appropriately
represented the statute's major theme.
The beneficiary variable identifies the litigant whom the statute designates as
the recipient of the attorney fee award. The authors classified the beneficiaries
according to the following categories: prevailing party, prevailing plaintiff, prevailing defendant, either party, 34 plaintiff, defendant, aggrieved party, 35 prevailing moving party, specific prevailing party (for example, prevailing farmer or
prevailing creditor), prevailing appellee, and prevailing appellant.
The mandatory/discretionary variable indicates whether the statute on its face
requires the court to award attorney fees (mandatory) to the designated beneficiary
or whether the award is left to court discretion (discretionary). In making this
determination, the authors relied upon the statutory language; the use of the word
"may" indicated discretion, while the use of the word "shall" or "must" indicated
36
the award was mandatory.
The next variable considered was the standard, if any, which the court is to
apply to determine whether a potential beneficiary's situation merits an award of
attorney fees. 37 Thus, this variable requires a court to find either that the paying
(8) Crime: pawnbroker violations, stolen goods, victim reparations;
(9) Debtor/Creditor relations: bankruptcy, garnishment;
(10) Education;
(11) Environmental Protection: land and water preservation; natural resource protection, nuisance claims;
(12) Family law: child custody, divorce, domestic relations;
(13) General Business Transactions: business regulation, construction law, controversies between businesses, franchise regulation;
(14) General litigation: appeals, discovery, frivolous and bad faith claims or defenses, small claims;
(15) Insurance;
(16) Labor relations: unfair labor practices, wage disputes;
(17) Property: eminent domain actions, personal and real property actions;
(18) Public agency or official violations: elections, public meeting laws;
(19) Public health and social welfare: licensing laws:
(20) Public utilties: common carriers, railroads, telephones;
(21) Rental housing: innkeeper relations, landlord/tenant actions;
(22) Securities laws;
(23) Tax laws;
(24) Torts: confidentiality breaches, invasion of privacy, libel and slander, property destruction;
(25) Worker's compensation; and
(26) Water laws.
34. "Either party" statutes vest the court with complete discretion in choosing the beneficiary of a fee
shift. Thus, a losing party, if the court so decides,, may have his attorney fees paid.
35. "Aggrieved party" attorney fee shifting statutes are found in the state civil procedure rules. In
these statutes, one party has acted in less than good faith in observing some of the state rules of civil
procedure. Accordingly, the beneficiary is the party that has been "aggrieved" by such conduct.
36. Although court interpretation of the statutory language might deviate somewhat from the literal
meaning in some instances, time constraints did not permit the authors to research judicial interpretation
of the statutes.
37. The following standards are found in the statutes:
(1) Ability to pay;
(2) Bad faith conduct;
(3) Vexatious litigation without cause;
(4) Condition precedent exists;
(5) Dilatory tactics;
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litigant took a specified action or that a certain condition exists before awarding
the attorney fee. For example, some statutes require, before a fee shift may occur,
a finding that the losing litigant engaged in bad faith or willful conduct.
The next variable against which each statute was evaluated was the method of
fee calculation. This variable looks at the statutory guidance, if any, given to the
courts in determining the amount to be awarded. 38
The final variable considered was purpose. The authors started with the
assumption that there was a motivating force behind the legislatures' enactments
of the attorney fee shifting statutes. It was often difficult, however, to identify the
exact legislative purpose behind a fee shifting statute because it often appeared
that there was more than one purpose motivating the legislature. Therefore, each
computer record was designed to accommodate up to three identifiable purposes.
Again, the accuracy and efficiency of the "purpose variable" are limited by the
inability of the authors to delve into each statute's legislative history. Nevertheless,
the authors believe that the results are sufficiently accurate to allow for some significant general conclusions.
Relying heavily upon a classification system developed by Professor Thomas
Rowe of Duke University School of Law, 39 the authors used six broad categories in
evaluating each attorney fee shifting statute. These six purposes are as follows:
(1) Full Compensation: 40 Under the American rule, a prevailing plaintiff's
effective recovery will usually be the awarded damages minus the costs of the suit.
Full compensation statutes seek to make the designated beneficiary whole; that is,
the award of attorney fees allows the winning party to be fully compensated for his
legal injuries. This type of statute also generally assumes that there was some
degree offault on the part of the losing party.
(2) Litigation Control: 4 1 These statutes are designed to prevent abuse of the
judicial system. For example, litigation control statutes would provide for an
award of attorney fees when an opposing party brings a frivolous claim or uses a
defense in bad faith.
(6) Frivolous claims;
(7) If plaintiff prevails, defendant must have acted willfully or knowingly, if defendant prevails, plaintiff
must have acted in bad faith;
(8) If plaintiff prevails, no standard, if defendant prevails, plaintiff must have acted in bad faith;
(9) Knowing or willful actions;
(10) Negligent actions; and
(11) To prevent fee shifting, substantial justification or good faith must be shown.
38. The following methods of calculating the fee award are found in the statutes:
(1) An "appropriate and moderate" fee;
(2) A fixed dollar amount;

(3) A fixed upper dollar ceiling;
(4) A maximum percentage of recovery;
(5) Out of pocket costs;

(6) A "reasonable" fee;
(7) No calculation method; and
(8) Percentage of the amount awarded

39.

Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifing."A CriticalOverview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.

40.
41.

d. at 657-59.
Id at 665-66.
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(3) Public Interest/Private Attorney General: 42 These statutes encourage specific suits because the litigation or litigation result confers benefits on the general
public. These statutes also provide encouragement to those litigants who could
not ordinarily bear the cost of such public interest suits.
(4) Punitive/Deterrent: 43 These statutes use the award of attorney fees to
punish the losing party for misconduct and to deter such misconduct in the first
instance. These statutes typically deal with areas where the defendant's level of
fault is higher than mere negligence.
(5) Equalization: 44 These statutes reflect an attitude that in certain areas there
is a need to equalize the litigation strengths of the parties. Thus, the legislature
may provide for an award of attorney fees to one party in order to correct a financial imbalance between the parties.
(6) Indemnity: 45 These statutes reflect the legislature's belief that a losing
party should pay the winning party's attorney fees. Thus, a party is not required
to bear the financial burden of proving a justifiable claim. This type of fee shift
most closely resembles the English rule.
Finally, each computer record contains an abbreviated description of each
encoded statute. 46 Through careful use of this brief description, the authors found
that more in-depth and particularized searches, especially with respect to subject
matter, could be undertaken.
IV
ANALYSIS

This section presents in tabular and graphic form the results of the survey
along with a brief analysis of the most significant results. Specifically, part A identifies those areas in which state legislatures are enacting fee shifting laws and
examines the most common methods of effecting fee shifting by statute. Part B
examines the correlation between fee shifting statutes and the state-specific variables. Finally, part C focuses on the historical trends in enactment of fee shifting
statutes.
A.

Predominant Methods of Attorney Fee Shifting by Statute

1. Subject Matter. By providing a numerical and percentage breakdown of the
1,974 attorney fee shifting statutes by the twenty-six designated categories, 47 table
1 identifies those areas in which state legislatures are enacting fee shifting laws.
Table 1 also reports in the far right hand column the number of states with at least
one statute dealing with that subject matter.
The data in table 1, however, not only identify the major areas in which fee
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id
Id
Id
Id

46.

The authors also listed the statute section citations in the computer record.

47.

See supra note 33.

at
at
at
at

662-63.
660-61.
663-65.
653-57.
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TABLE 1
SUBJECT MATTER
TOTAL

PERCENTAGE

STATE COVERAGE

General Litigation

355

18.0

50

SUBJECT MATTER

Property

195

9.9

37

Consumer

132

6.7

34

Family

121

6.1

33

Labor

110

5.6

34

General Trade Regulation

107

5.4

33

State Violations

90

4.6

29

Rental Housing

71

3.6

26

Insurance

71

3.6

36

Assessments

70

3.6

23

Utilities

64

3.2

21

Antitrust

58

2.9

27

Corporations

56

2.8

25

Torts

56

2.8

25

Civil Rights

54

2.7

28

Environment

49

2.5

21

Debtor/Creditor

44

2.2

21

Agriculture

42

2.1

13

Worker's Compensation

37

1.9

22

Public Health

35

1.8

18

Crime

31

1.6

22

Banking

30

1.5

20

Water

30

1.5

13

Taxation

28

1.4

16

Securities

23

1.2

18

Education

15

.8

11

TOTAL

1974

100.0

51

shifting is occurring; they also yield two interesting findings. First, as noted above,
general litigation or procedural statutes are the single most prevalent type of
attorney fee shifting statutes; indeed, procedural attorney fee shifting statutes are
found in 50 of the 51 surveyed jurisdictions. 48 Nevertheless, nonprocedural statutes account for over 80% of all state attorney fee shifting statutes. The presence of
this many nonprocedural attorney fee shifting statutes in so many diverse areas
reflects a fairly strong legislative effort, on the whole, to deviate from the American
rule in substantive areas. Second, although-as noted by table 1-attorney fee
shifting statutes have been enacted in a number of diverse areas, the authors often
48. A partial explanation for the high number of general litigation statutes and rules awarding
attorney fees is that about three-quarters of the states have adopted rules modeled on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provide for attorney fee awards when an opposing party is at fault. See Fed. R. Civ.
6
P. 30(g), 37(a)-(d), 5 (g).
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found that a large number of states had enacted similar fee shifting statutes. For
example, 23 states have enacted similar eminent domain statutes which award
prevailing defendant landowners attorney fees in eminent domain actions brought
by the state or other condemning parties. In addition, a number of states have
similar statutes providing for attorney fee shifting in "dishonored check" cases.
The authors found two possible explanations for the presence of similar statutes
in a wide number of states. First, a number of state legislatures often enact statutes
as part of national movements that encourage the enactment of "uniform statutes," and these model statutes often contain subsidiary sections providing for fee
shifting. For example, that general litigation statutes exist in almost every state is
mostly explained by the fact that many states have merely incorporated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its fee shifting provisions into their own rules.
Indeed, a number of states have enacted uniform statutes with affixed fee shifting
provisions in such areas as child custody laws, consumer credit, franchiseefranchisor relations, and insurance.
The second possible explanation for the prevalence of similar state attorney fee
shifting statutes is that states have recognized that in certain areas a strict application of the American rule would work an injustice on one of the litigants. For
example, recognizing that a strict application of the American rule in divorce cases
would severely handicap the poorer-possibly, nonworking-spouse, a number of
states have enacted similar fee shifting statutes that grant the court total discretion
in divorce proceedings to decide which party, win or lose, is entitled to attorney
fees. This type of reasoning can also help explain the enactment of similar state
statutes dealing with mechanics liens, child support payments, and unpaid wages.
2. Beneficiao,. Table 2 provides a tabular breakdown of the beneficiaries of state
attorney fee shifting statutes. Surprisingly, over 54% of fee shifting statutes desigTABLE 2
BENEFICIARY
BENEFICIARY

TOTAL

PERCENTAGE

1,073

54.4

Prevailing party

383

19.4

Prevailing defendant

165

8.4

Aggrieved party

152

7.7

Either party

70

3.6

Moving party

41

2.1

Specific prevailing party

30

1.5

Defendant

21

1.1

Plaintiff

15

.8

Prevailing appellee

10

.5

Prevailing appellant

6

.3

Other

8

.4

Prevailing plaintiff

TOTAL

1974

100.0
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nate the prevailing plaintiff as the beneficiary of the fee shift while only 19% of
such states designate the prevailing party as beneficiary. 49 This statistic is significant in itself in that it indicates that states, in response to the American rule, have
not sought to embrace the English rule which designates the victorious litigant or
prevailing party as the beneficiary of the fee award. Indeed, the large number
(1591) of nonprevailing party attorney fee shifting statutes seems to reflect a new
type of fee shifting. That is, rather than allowing the litigation's outcome to be the
sole determinant of the beneficiary, the state legislatures have made prelitigation
decisions favoring one party over another. And, as noted by table 2, legislatures
have tended to favor making judicial action more attractive for plaintiffs.
At this point, it is also appropriate to inquire whether a fee shifting statute's
subject matter influences the designation of the beneficiary and whether this influence can be explained. A simple correlation of subject matter with beneficiary
demonstrated that the beneficiary variable did indeed vary according to subject
matter category. For example, consumer fee shifting statutes are 74% prevailing
plaintiff statutes. Since most plaintiffs in these cases will be consumers, this favoritism for plaintiffs reflects a favoritism for consumers. Similarly, prevailing plaintiff statutes account for 79% of antitrust fee shifting statutes, possibly reflecting a
legislative belief that meritorious antitrust suits by poorer litigants should not be
discouraged because of the length and cost of such litigation.
In contrast, the family law and general litigation categories have a relatively
low number of prevailing plaintiff fee shifting statutes. Of the 121 family law
statutes, only 34 are prevailing plaintiff statutes, while 46 of these statutes are
either party statutes. 50 Since either party statutes vest the court with to/al discretion in selecting the fee shift beneficiary, the prevalence of either party statutes is
explained by the legislatures' desire to allow the court total discretion in order to
equalize the litigating strengths of the parties in divorce and child custody proceedings. Of the 355 general litigation fee shifting statutes, only 27 are prevailing
plaintiff statutes. Indeed, most of the general litigation fee shifting statutes are
aggrieved party statutes. This low number of prevailing plaintiff statutes, however, is explained when one considers the purpose behind general litigation statutes. The high prevalence of prevailing plaintiff and prevailing defendant fee
shifting statutes in nonprocedural areas suggests that the legislatures are very
much concerned with helping or protecting certain litigants. In contrast, however,
most procedural fee shifting statutes are less concerned with protecting a certain
party and more concerned with preventing abuse of the judicial process. Thus,
general litigation statutes will tend to identify the beneficiary in terms of
preventing abuses of the judicial system-aggrieved party, prevailing moving
49. Of particular interest are those 36 statutes which award attorney fees to the plaintiff or to the
defendant even though that party may lose. This absolute right to attorney fees is somewhat tempered in
that virtually all of these statutes require the judge either to exercise discretion in making an award or to
find a condition exists before the award can be made. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5710 (West Supp. 1984)
(employer who requests deposition from employee during workman's compensation hearing may be
required to pay employee's attorney fee).
50. Family law statutes account for 46 of the 70 either party statutes.
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party, or prevailing party-rather than seeking to protect specific parties-prevailing plaintiff, prevailing defendant, or prevailing specific party. That the beneficiary variable does fluctuate acording to subject matter and that this variance
can be rationally explained suggests that the legislatures have for the most part
engaged in rational decisionmaking when choosing the beneficiary.
3. Mandatoiy/Discretionay. Table 3 indicates that over 64% of attorney fee
shifting statutes mandate a court award of attorney fees, while 34% grant the court
discretion whether to make the fee award to the designated beneficiary. These
statistics, however, must not be read to indicate that in 64% of fee shifting statutes,
the court may not exercise any discretion over the fee award. Many of the
mandatory statutes also have a standard that the court must apply in order for the
beneficiary to be awarded his attorney fee. Accordingly, the courts will retain
some discretion when deciding whether the standard has been met. For example,
many general litigation statutes mandate an attorney fee award unless the paying
party can prove his actions were substantially justified. Thus, the court must exercise its discretion in determining whether "substantial justification" existed. In
fat, 342 mandatory statutes have accompanying standards. Thus, in the majority
of attorney fee shifting statutes, the court will be exercising a certain amount of
discretion. Nevertheless, that such a large number of statutes vest the court with
virtually total discretion in whether or not to award attorney fees is in itself significant. Such a practice represents a significant departure from the English rule
which mandates an award to the prevailing party; moreover, the presence of a discretionary statute represents the legislature's belief that the awarding of attorney
fees in certain areas requires a case-by-case balancing of the equities.
TABLE 3
MANDATORY/DISCRETIONARY
Mandatory/Discretionary
Mandatory

Discretionary
Mandatory for plaintiff or
discretionary for defendant

TOTAL

PERCENTAGE

1,282

65.0

669

33.9

18

.9

Combination

4

.2

Unclear

1

.1

TOTAL

1974

100.0

It also is appropriate to inquire whether this variable seems to be influenced by
the statute's subject matter or beneficiary. These correlations produced few significant results, however. A correlation between subject matter and the
mandatory/discretionary variable reveals only one subject matter which has
predominantly discretionary statutes. Of the 121 family law statutes, 106 are discretionary statutes. Such a result, however, seems logical in the family law statutes, since these statutes mostly deal with controversies-child custody and divorce
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proceedings-that require the courts to balance the equities. 5 1 Finally, a correlation between beneficiary and the mandatory/discretionary variable produced two
interesting results: (1) prevailing party attorney fee shifting statutes are 37% discretionary while (2) prevailing plaintiff statutes are only 27% discretionary.
4. Standard Our survey of the standards that govern courts when awarding
attorney fees revealed that the most popular means of drafting a statute is without
a standard; indeed, only 29% of state attorney fee have any standard to follow.
Nevertheless, with respect to those statutes with standards, two items merit note.
First, bad faith and substantial justification standards are confined mostly to general litigation statutes. In contrast, condition precedent and knowing or willful
standards are the most common standards for nonprocedural attorney fee shifting
statutes.
TABLE 4
STANDARD
STANDARD
No standard in statute

TOTAL

PERCENTAGE

1423

72.1

1,974

100.0

Unless there was substantial
justification or good faith
Condition precedent
Bad faith
Knowing or willful
Frivolous claim
Prevailing plaintiff no
standard/Prevailing defendant,
plaintiff acts in bad faith
Vexatious and without cause
Prevailing plaintiff, defendant
acts knowingly; prevailing
defendant, plaintiff acts in bad
faith
Unless plaintiff's claim is frivolous
Ability to pay
Negligent
Combination standard
Dilatory tactics
State may not recover
TOTAL

5. Calculation. Few statutes provide an exact formulation for calculating the
attorney fee award. Rather, as noted by table 5, the vast majority of attorney fee
statutes merely require the court to award "reasonable fees" to the beneficiary. In

51.

See also supra note 34.
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TABLE 5
CALCULATION
TOTAL
1,602

CALCULATION
Reasonable

PERCENTAGE
81.2

205

10.4

Percentage of the amount awarded

41

2.1

Fixed upper dollar ceiling

36

1.8

Out of pocket

32

1.6

Fixed maximum percentage

24

1.2

No calculation standard

Fixed dollar amount
Appropriate & moderate
Other

addition, over 10% of the attorney fee shifting statutes provide no guidance to the
court on the amount to be awarded. That over 90% of state attorney fee shifting
statutes provide such little guidance on the method of calculating the fee shift
might initially be surprising when one considers the high cost of litigation. This
lack of guidance on calculation, however, may merely be due to the legislatures'
belief that a fee award can best be determined on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, there are a number of statutes which specifically limit the amount to be
awarded, through using either a fixed dollar amount or a fixed percentage of the
52
award.
6. Purpose. Finally, it is appropriate to examine briefly the seemingly major purposes behind attorney fee shifting statutes. As noted in table 6, full compensation
TABLE 6
PURPOSE
PURPOSE

TOTAL

PERCENTAGEa

Full compensation

742

37.6%

Punitive

647

32.8%

Litigation control

570

28.9%

Public interest

324

16.4%

Indemnity

207

Equalization

202

10.5%
10.2%

TOTAL

136.4%

These percentages reflect the percent of attorney fee shifting statutes that have the following purposes.
Since a statute could have more than one purpose, the percentages will add up to more than 100.

52. As noted by table 5, a number of statutes fix the amount which can be awarded as attorney fees.
Many of the fixed dollar amounts, however, are out of date with present day attorney prices. Thus, a fixed
dollar fee shifting statute should be continually revised in order to accommodate changing economic conditions such as inflation.

Page 321: Winter 1984]

STATE STATUTES

is the most prevalent legislative purpose behind attorney fee shifting statutes; over
37% of all such statutes have full compensation as a purpose.5 3 Of interest, however, is the low percentage of statutes with indemnity as a purpose. As noted previously, indemnity purpose statutes most likely resemble the English rule. 54 Thus,
the low percentage of these statutes again reinforces our previous conclusion that
states have not adopted the English rule. Finally, the low number of public
interest fee shifting statutes, on the whole, demonstrates that states have not
actively sought as extensively as might have been expected to use attorney fee
shifting statutes as a means of promoting public welfare or public rights.
B.

State-Specific Variables

This section focuses on two areas. First, it examines the apparent comprehensiveness of state fee shifting statute schemes and whether fee shifting laws are being
enacted with equal vigor in all states. Second, this section explores the relationship
between fee shifting statutes and three state-specific variables: state population,
population concentration, and geographic region.
1. Slate Breakdown. As noted by table 7, the number of fee shifting statutes per
state ranges from a high of 146 statutes in California to a low of 2 in North Carolina. Indeed, table 7 conclusively demonstrates that enactment of attorney fee
shifting statutes has not been uniform across the states. To reach some general
conclusions about the comprehensiveness of each state's scheme, however, it proves
helpful to divide the 51 "states" into four groups: states with 0 to 20 fee shifting
statutes; states with 21 to 50 fee shifting statutes; states with 51 to 75 fee shifting
statutes; and states with more than 75 fee shifting statutes.
Twenty states have twenty or fewer fee shifting statutes. An analysis of these
states using three guides suggests that, on the whole, these states have not made
much of a legislative effort to deviate from the American rule.
First, although comprising slightly less than 40% of the surveyed jurisdictions,
these states acount for only 9% of the states' attorney fee shifting laws. Second,
general litigation statutes represent almost half of the statutes in these states,
whereas such statutes only represent one-sixth of the statutes nationwide. The
prevalence of these general litigation statutes demonstrates a lack of legislative
concern with substantive attorney fee shifting laws. Finally, an analysis of the
types of subject matters that are covered by these 20 states' attorney fee shifting
laws reveals that the mean number of subject matters covered per state is roughly
5; for states with fewer than 10 statutes this number falls to 2. Thus, the low
number of attorney fee shifting statutes per state, the low number of subject
53. As noted by Dr. Pfennigstorf in this symposium, full compensation is the major purpose behind
European fee shifting statutes. Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shif/ing, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984 at 37.

54.

See supra p. 328.
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TABLE 7
STATE BREAKDOWN

STATE
California
Oregon
Florida
Minnesota
Montana
Texas
Louisiana
Nebraska
Oklahoma
Illinois
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Arizona
Washington
Michigan
Iowa
Hawaii
Kansas
Connecticut
New Jersey
Mississippi
Wisconsin
Maine
South Carolina
Nevada
Ohio
Massachusetts
Vermont
Missouri
New York
Idaho
South Dakota
Utah
Alaska
Arkansas
Virginia
District of Columbia
Indiana
Delaware
Maryland
Georgia
New Mexico
Tennessee
Colorado
Kentucky
Alabama
West Virginia
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Wyoming
North Carolina

TOTAL
146
140
103
82
73
72
70
68
68
65
63
59
57
57
50
49
46
46
45
45
43
43
39
35
34
32
26
25
24
23
22
20
18
16
16
15
14
14
13
13
11
11
11
10
8
17
7
6
6
6
2

TOTAL

1974
Mean

PERCENTAGE
7.4
7.1
5.2
4.2
3.7
3.7
3.6
3.4
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.0
2.9
2.9
2.5
2.5
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.0
.9
.8
.8
.8
.7
.7
.7
.7
.6
.6
.6
.5
.4
.4
.4
.3
.3
.3
.1
100.0

38.7

SUBJECT MATTERa
CONCENTRATION
26
25
24
21
18
22
21
18
24
22
22
17
18
16
19
19
14
19
20
19
16
16
16
14
11
13
11
13
13
13
12
9
11
4
9
8
7
7
6
5
8
5
6
3
2
2
2
4
2
1
2
26
Median

32

a Subject matter concentration refers to the number of subject matter categories in which at least one

attorney fee shifting statute has been enacted in that state.
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matters covered per state, and the very high percentage of general litigation fee
shifting statutes suggest that these 20 states have not taken any real comprehensive
legislative action to deviate from the American rule.
Caution is required at this point, however. The small number of attorney fee
shifting statutes alone, without any indication of the breadth of their applicability,
is of less significance. For example Alaska, while having fewer than 20 attorney fee
55
shifting statutes, has effectively legislated away the American rule.
An analysis of the 17 states with 21 to 50 fee shifting statutes reveals that each
state's fee shifting scheme is becoming more comprehensive. General litigation
statutes account for only 19% of all fee shifting statutes in these states, reflecting a
more vigorous move into substantive areas. Similarly, the mean number of subject
matters covered per state has risen to 15, also reflecting a broader fee shifting
scheme.
The fee shifting scheme is even broader for those 10 states with 51 to 75 statutes. Among these states, the mean number of subject matters covered is 20, and
general litigation statutes account for only 14% of all fee shifting statutes. The
remaining states-California (146), Florida (103), Minnesota (82), and Oregon
(140)-account for 24% of the nation's fee shifting statutes.5 6 Unsurprisingly, general litigation statutes account for only 8% of all these statutes and the states have
enacted attorney fee shifting statutes in virtually all of the subject matter categories-California (26), Oregon (25), Minnesota (25), and Florida (24).
The above analysis provides two important observations. First, the enactment
of state attorney fee shifting statutes as a means to deviate from the American rule
has not been a national phenomenon. Indeed, our analysis suggests that a large
number of states have not mounted any real legislative effort to deviate from the
American rule. Second, the fact that as fee shifting statutes per state increase the
range of subject matters covered also increases suggests that states are not focusing
fee shifting statutes in specific judicial areas. In fact, no state showed a tendency to
focus predominantly on one substantive area while ignoring others when enacting
attorney fee shifting statutes. Indeed, this apparent lack of legislative focus in
enacting fee shifting laws may reflect that attorney fee shifting statutes are the
result of pressure from various interest groups rather than the result of a coordinated legislative effort to systematically remove the American rule from certain
areas.
2.

Other State-Specific Variables.

a. Population. Table 8 shows that, on the whole, attorney fee shifting statutes are less prevalent in less populated states. Indeed, one might believe that a
correlation exists between population and the number of attorney fee shifting statutes. Caution again is required, however, since the results may simply reflect a
55.

See

ALASKA

R. CiV. P. 82 (court has discretion to award attorney fees to prevailing party); see also

ALASKA STAT. § 9.06.010 (1983).

56. The high number of attorney fee shifting statutes in these four states accounts for much of the
difference between the mean (32) and the median (38).
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TABLE 8
STATE POPULATION
Category

Total

Percentage

Per State

Large

595

30.1

66.1

Medium

892

45.2

37.2

Small

487

24.7

27.1

TABLE 9
STATE POPULATION CONCENTRATION
Category

Total

Percentage

Urban

1,419

71.9

Rural

555

28.1

Per State

lower level of legislative activity within less populated states rather than any particular treatment of attorney fees.
b. Population concentration. An initial analysis of table 9 suggests that rural
areas are not as apt to enact as many fee shifting statutes as urban areas. By
correlating large, medium, and small states with urban and rural states, however,
one can see that such an initial assumption is misguided. When urban and rural
states with similar populations are compared, as in table 10, the problems with
such an assumption become apparent; the opposing mean and median numbers
for urban and rural states with similar populations suggest that the urban/rural
distinction has no real effect on the enactment of fee shifting statutes. In fact the
high average for urban states shown in table 9 is mostly attributable to the
large/urban states-an area in which no comparison can be made with rural
states.
TABLE 10
CORRELATION OF POPULATION WITH POPULATION CONCENTRATION
Urban

Rural

No. of States Large

Mean
Median

No. of States Medium

Mean
Median

Mean
Median

17

= 40.6
- 26

No. of States Small

9

- 66.1
= 59

=

6
21.83
16

No. of States =

0

No. of States =

7

Mean
Median

= 28.3
= 35

No. of States = 12
Mean
Median

= 29.67
= 21
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c. Geographical region. As demonstrated by table 11, the number of attorney
fee shifting statutes enacted by region varies significantly from a high of 81 fee
shifting statutes per state in the Pacific region to a low of 9 fee shifting statutes per
state in the Southeastern region. This statistic alone suggests that a state's geographical region may have an impact on the state's enactment of fee shifting statutes and, indeed, a closer examination of the regions reveals that a state's
propensity to enact fee shifting statutes seems to be influenced by neighboring
states' activity in enacting fee shifting statues.
TABLE 11
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
Number
of States

TotaJ
Statutes

Percentage of
National Total

Mean Statutes
Per State

Pacific

5

405

20.5

81.0

Midwest

6

328

16.6

54.7

South Central

5

250

12.7

50.0

Mountain

8

231

11.7

28.9

North Central

5

204

10.3

40.8

Southern

5

199

10.1

39.8

Mid-Atlantic

7

174

8.8

24.9

New England

6

147

7.5

24.5

Southeastern

4

36

1.8

9.0

Region

First, table 11 reveals that the four easternmost regions 57 have the fewest
attorney fee shifting statutes. In fact, 20 out of the 22 states in these four eastern
regions have fewer than 50 statutes per state; while 12 of the remaining 29 states
have more than 50 statutes per state. Second, an analysis of those states with fewer
than 20 statutes reveals that these states are basically clumped together in two
geographical groups: four states in the Mountain region 58 and eleven states in the
South and Southeastern regions of the country.59 An analysis of the other states
also reveals that many neighboring states are enacting similar numbers of attorney
fee shifting laws. Thus, although the data are far from conclusive, the above analysis does suggest that a state's location influences its enactment of fee shifting
statutes.
Since region may have an effect upon the overall number of fee shifting statutes enacted, it is also appropriate to inquire whether certain types of fee shifting
statutes seem to be more prevalent in some regions than others. The correlation of
region with attorney fee shifting statutes' subject matters did reveal that certain
57. The four easternmost regions are: the Mid-Atlantic, New England, Southeastern, and Southern.
58. These four states are Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
59. These eleven states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky,
Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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types of fee shifting statutes were relatively more prevalent in some regions than
other regions. A brief listing of the most significant results follows.
The Mid-Atlantic region accounts for a high number of attorney fee shifting
statutes in the corporate (9) law area. While corporation statutes account for only
2.8% of the national total of statutes in this survey, corporation statutes account for
5.2% of the Mid-Atlantic's fee shifting statutes. 60 In contrast, the Midwest region
accounts for a relatively high number of utility (20) and civil rights (13) fee
shifting statutes. For example, utility statutes account for 6.1% of the Midwest
region's attorney fee shifting statutes, but only 3.2% of the national total. Surprisingly, the Mountain region has a high number of corporate (11) fee shifting statutes, while having only one agricultural fee shifting law. The New England states
have enacted a very high number of consumer (21) and tort (8) fee shifting
statutes.

While the percentage of general litigation fee shifting statutes found in the
Pacific region is unsurprisingly low (10%),6 1 the region has enacted a relatively
high number of agriculture (10), assessment (19), civil rights (43), general trade
regulation (29), property (43), tort (24), and water (16) attorney fee shifting statutes. Of particular interest is the very high number of tort and water attorney fee
shifting statutes. 62 Nevertheless, the high number of these types of statutes may be
explained by looking at regional interests. For example, the expansion of tort liability in California might have affected enactment of attorney fee shifting laws in
this area. In addition, the high number of water rights attorney fee shifting statutes reflect greater concern about water supplies in an arid and increasingly populated west coast. Finally, the southern region accounts for a high number of
environment (12), agriculture (14), and taxation (8) fee shifting statutes.
Of course, without in-depth statistical analysis and a greater inquiry into these
regions, the significance of these deviations from national percentages is uncertain.
Nevertheless, prevalence of a certain type of attorney fee shifting statute within a
region may indicate a problem of regional importance.
C.

Historical Analysis of State Attorney Fee Shifting Laws

This section looks at the enactment of attorney fee shifting statutes over time.
Before embarking on the analysis, however, it is again important to remember that
the survey looked at those statutes currently in force. Thus, the low number of
older statutes may not fully reflect the actual number of statutes enacted in earlier
decades. Nevertheless, the authors believe that the included statutes present a sufficient basis for some general conclusions and explanations.
As noted by table 12 and graph 1, only 20.5% of all attorney fee statutes currently in force were enacted before 1950. Beginning in the 1950's, however,
60. Delaware with its liberal corporation laws has no corporate fee shifting statutes.
61. Without including Alaska, the percentage of general litigation fee shifting statutes in the Pacific
region drops to 7.5%.
62. While tort statutes account for 5.9% of the Pacific region's attorney fee shifting statutes, such
statutes account for only 2.8% of the national total. Similarly, water statutes represent 4.0% of all the
Pacific region's attorney fee shifting statutes, but only 1.5% of the national total.
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attorney fee shifting statutes have been enacted with increasing frequency.
Indeed, 54% of all existing state fee shifting statutes have been enacted since 1970;
however, as shown by table 12, the growth of attorney fee shifting statutes since
1970 has been fairly even, suggesting that the growth in this type of statutes has
leveled off. This recent pattern suggests that attorney fee shifting statutes will continue to be enacted at a high but fairly stable level.
The recent increase in fee shifting statutes is probably due to a number of
factors. Indeed, two of the reasons for this increase may be the recent rise in legal
fees, and a greater awareness by legislatures as to the many purposes that can be
accomplished by such statutes.
Besides looking at the historical evolution of attorney fee shifting statutes as a
whole, however, the authors also compared date of enactment with geographical
region, subject matter, and purpose.
TABLE 12
ENACTMENT DISTRIBUTION
Time Period

Total

Percentage

1900

96

4.86

1901-1910

42

2.13

1911-1920

45

2.28

1921-1930

43

2.18

1931-1940

88

4.46

1941-1950

91

4.61

1951-1960

157

7.95

1961-1970

340

17.22

1971-1980

910

46.10

1981-1982

8.21

Total

100.00

1970-1982

DISTRIBUTION

Time Period

Total

Percentage

1971-1972

144

7.3

1973-1974

202

10.2

1975-1976

181

9.2

1977-1978

194

9.8

1979-1980

189

9.6

1981-1982

162

8.2

Total

1072

54.3

1. GeographicalRegion. An examination of the enactment dates of state attorney
fee shifting laws within each geographical region revealed that all the regions have
essentially followed the national growth pattern. The regions with the largest
number of attorney fee shifting statutes (Pacific, South Central, and Midwest
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GRAPH 1
ENACTMENT TRENDS

910)
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19811990,

Enactment Periods
a The 1981-1990 number represents a projection using the 1981-1982 figures as a base.

regions) have experienced slower percentage growth in fee shifting statutes over
the last 20 years than those regions with fewer statutes. This result, however,
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merely indicates that before 1960, these regions already had enacted a substantial
number of attorney fee shifting statutes.
2. Subject Matter. While 71.5% of the nation's fee shifting statutes have been
enacted since 1960, this growth has not been uniform across subject matters.
Accordingly, this subsection looks at these subject matters that differ significantly
from the national growth rate and explores some possible explanations.
For example, 86% of existing general trade regulation statutes have been
enacted since 1960. Indeed, 15 general trade regulation fee shifting statutes have
been enacted since 1980, possibly signalling strong growth of fee shifting statutes in
this area. Similarly, 93.2% of all consumer attorney fee shifting statutes have been
enacted since 1960. Moreover, environmental attorney fee shifting statutes have
also experienced rapid growth recently, with 81.6% being enacted since 1960.
Rental housing attorney fee shifting statutes have also experienced rapid growth;
only one shifting statutes was enacted before 1960. Similarly, family (80.2%),
crime (96.8%), tort (91.1%), banking (80%), civil rights (87.2%), and education
(80%) attorney fee shifting statutes have all experienced rapid growth since 1970.
In contrast, a few subject matters have not experienced such rapid growth.
Only 22.9% of general assessment statutes have been enacted since 1960. Indeed,
enactment of these statutes has appeared fairly uniform over the years. Taxation
(28.6%) and utility (34.4%) statutes have also experienced relatively slow growth
since 1960. The slow growth of the utility attorney fee shifting statutes may be
somewhat deceiving since a large number of these statutes were enacted before
1910 (26.6%), probably in response to the growth of the railroad industry. Agriculture (61.9%), corporation (62.5%), debtor/creditor (52.3%), insurance (52.8%),
water (36.7%), and worker's compensation (48.6%) attorney fee shifting statutes
63
have also experienced relatively slow growth over the last two decades.
3. Purpose. Plotting purpose across times, as noted by table 13, demonstrated
that legislatures are increasingly emphasizing equalization, indemnity, and public
interest purposes in enacting statutes. For example, 80.5% of all public interest
attorney fee shifting statutes have been enacted since 1960. Moreover, the percentage of public interest statutes as compared to the other statutes is growing.
For example, 8.8% of all the statutes enacted between 1941 and 1950 had public
interest purposes. During 1970 to 1980, the percentage of attorney fee shifting
statutes with public interest purposes had risen to 19.5%. Indemnity and equalization statutes have also experienced rapid growth since 1960.
In contrast, full compensation attorney fee shifting statutes, although still being
enacted in large numbers, have experienced slower percentage growth; only 60% of
full compensation statutes have been enacted since 1960. Also, the proportion of
full compensation statutes to statutes with other purposes has declined steadily
63. The remaining subject matter categories experienced growth similar to the national growth trend.
The following list provides the percentage of statutes in each remaining category which were enacted after
1960: antitrust (67.0%), general litigation (77.2%), labor (66.4%), public health (68.6%), property (66.2%),
securities (73.9%), and state violations (75.6%).
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since the 1920s-from 67.4% in 1921-1930 to 31.5% in 1970-1980. Thus, legislatures are not using attorney fee shifting statutes for a single purpose, but are
increasingly emphasizing a variety of purposes.
TABLE 13
PURPOSEa OVER TIME

Full

Litigation

Public

Compensation

Punitive

Control

Interest

Indemnity

Equalization

<1900

46

26

19

12

10

10

1909

1910

27

14

2

7

3

3

1911

1920

24

14

9

3

6

4

4

6

1921

1930

29

10

5

1

1931

1940

63

24

15

10

4

3

25

8

4

7

1941

1950

44

31

1951

1960

62

50

48

22

7

13

49

36

35

1961

1970

109

110

120

1971

1980

287

310

284

178

107

101

1981

1982

51

58

43

34

26

20

742

647

570

324

207

202

TOTAL

a It is important to remember that each statute may have more than one purpose. See supra p. 327.

IV
EFFECT OF STATE ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING STATUTES

Although the survey focused on the descriptive and historical features of state
attorney fee shifting statutes, the authors also sought to ascertain the effect of these
statutes on actual litigation. Unfortunately, a detailed inquiry into the effect of
these statutes was difficult since an examination of the judicial application of each
statute would have proven prohibitively time consuming. Nevertheless, the
authors were able to form some general impressions by using two limited search
techniques.
The authors spot-checked a sampling of state cases to see if attorney fee shifting
statutes were being used. 64 This cursory sampling of cases revealed that state
attorney fee shifting statutes are having some effect upon the American rule, espe64. This sampling of cases was accomplished by using simple search strategies on Lexis. For the five
surveyed states-Alabama, Alaska, California, Kansas, and Oregon-the authors first identified, using
Lexis, a limited number of 1982 reported cases that could easily be searched in order to find whether
attorney fee shifting statutes were having any impact. For example, for Kansas, the authors identified 100
reported 1982 cases as their base sample. Having identified a group of cases to search, the authors then
searched these cases for cases mentioning "attorney fees" or "attorney costs." Those cases mentioning
"attorney fees" or "attorney costs" were then individually examined to determine whether the case's discussion of attorney fees was in connection with a state attorney fee shifting statute. These latter cases, therefore, are the ones that indicate whether state attorney fee shifting laws are having an impact upon the
American rule.
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cially in those states with large numbers of attorney fee shifting statutes. In a
sampling of 100 reported California appellate cases, the authors found that in 7 of
these cases the award of attorney fees was governed by a statute and mentioned in
the court opinion. An examination of Oregon reported cases also revealed a
number of cases in which an attorney fee award was required by statute. In contrast a sampling of approximately 100 Kansas cases revealed only 4 cases in which
an attorney fee shifting statute governed an award of attorney fees. Finally, a sampling of 100 cases from Alabama revealed only one case in which an attorney fee
award was dictated by a statute. It is probable, however, that a survey of reported
civil cases, which were exclusively appellate cases, would underestimate the influence of state fee shifting statutes because the fact that a particular case is governed
by an attorney fee shifting statute may not be mentioned on appeal.
As a second method for ascertaining the effect of attorney fee shifting statutes
upon the American rule, the authors briefly scanned the annotations following
each statute. This review of annotations indicated that, while a number of statutes
showed substantial use, the majority of fee shifting statutes showed little, if any,
use. Again, one must be careful not to read too much into this finding since the
lack of annotations under a statute may merely represent the newness of the
statute or a lack of controversy concerning its interpretation. Nevertheless, the
lack of use of large numbers of state attorney fee shifting statutes does suggest that
lawyers may be ignorant of their existence.
Admittedly, this analysis into the impact of these state attorney fee shifting law
is less than conclusive. Nevertheless, the limited examination into this subject suggests that, at present, these statutes are having some effect. In particular, the
appearance of fee award discussion in a substantial number of reported civil
appeals in two states (California and Oregon) among those in the nation having
the largest number of fee shifting laws may be the tip of a fairly large iceberg. In
Alaska, where fee shifting is the general practice and, thus, likely involved in a
majority of civil cases, the authors found discussion of fee award issues in only
about one-fifth (56 of 266) of reported civil appeals surveyed. For numerous reasons fee awards will not always be appealed or dealt with in appellate court opinions; so, if anything, the authors' necessarily brief and inconclusive surveys are
likely to underestimate the incidence with which fee award statutes are invoked.
VI
CONCLUSION

The most surprising result of this survey was that there are so many attorney
fee shifting statutes-at least 1,974. Indeed, this number probably underrepresents
all state attorney fee shifting statutes, since the survey certainly did not uncover all
state attorney fee shifting statutes and since states continue to enact fee shifting
laws. 65 Nevertheless, the survey results highlight the diversity of state fee shifting
statutes. Not only are fee shifting statutes being enacted in many subject matters;
65. In California, for example, over fifteen new fee shifting statutes have been enacted since the survey
was concluded.
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but-unlike the English rule which provides a uniform method of fee shiftingsuch statutes are being drafted in a variety of ways, demonstrating that legislatures
are trying to accomplish a variety of purposes with these statutes.
This survey also is significant in that it demonstrates that fee shifting statutes
have not been enacted with equal vigor in every state. Indeed, there are a number
of states that have not taken any substantial action to
rule. Finally, strong growth in attorney fee shifting
decades suggests that state attorney fee shifting statutes
on a fairly large scale. Thus, the survey, on the whole,

deviate from the American
statutes over the last two
will continue to be enacted
demonstrates a strong, but

selective and partial, legislative effort to deviate from the American rule.
The actual impact that state attorney fee shifting statutes are having upon the
American rule is unclear. Despite this uncertainty, however, the authors' brief
review of reported cases did reveal that these statutes, although not having an
overwhelming effect, are having some impact upon the traditional American rule,
especially in those states that have large numbers of attorney fee shifting statutes.
Indeed, the impact of these statutes on the American rule will likely increase as
more are enacted and awareness of them increases.

